 |
Posts Tagged ‘www.businessneweurope.eu’
Saturday, December 20th, 2008
Here is the weekend update from MBS staff…and an article from www.businessneweurope.eu
While we agree with much of Ben here, we note the wide disparity not only between Ukrainian Government projections-which are optimistic to say the least-but also among the various firms tracking the Ukrainian economy.
We find it ironic that Ukraine’s economy is considered more diverse than many other economics, yet the emphasis is still on steel prices. The consensus would be that it is the lynchpin of the Ukrainian economy.
The one thing we believe will happen are more privatizations. We also don’t think the Ukrainian Government projection of a 7.30 hryvnia to the U.S. dollar as the average rate for 2009 is realistic. We believe the hryvnia will depreciate further in 2009. That could however, accelerate reforms. However, Ukraine will have to endure economic pain during that transition period.
|
UKRAINE 2009: tough times ahead |
|
Ben Aris in Berlin
December 20, 2008
Ukraine will have a harder time of it in 2009 than any other country in the region. It enters the year in recession and the prospects for growth in the second half of the year depend heavily on what happens to the global economy.
In general, the economy remains more resistant to external shocks, as it is relatively well diversified by Eastern European standards and the large consumer base helps. However, public finances are in mess and monetary policy is weak. The banking system was also teetering on the brink of collapse in late 2008 when the National Bank of Ukraine had to resort to administrative measures to prevent bank runs and a total meltdown.
The crisis was feeding through into the retail sector by the end of 2008 as retail turnover fell by 1.1% in November after growing by 16% the month before, bringing a consumer boom that has been running for years to an end.
An emergency $16.5bn loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), of which $4.5bn was already disbursed before the end of 2008, saved Ukraine’s bacon during the worst of the instability.
Still, the outlook for the second half of 2009 is rosier and Ukraine has made a lot of progress in recent years. “By many measures, Ukraine is currently much more immune to cyclical shocks: foreign exchange reserves have increased substantially, foreign capital increased its share on the local financial market (which is now well capitalized and profitable), the fiscal system has a strong budget code (with defined roles and responsibilities in the budget process) and the [World Trade Organisation] has liberalized external trade,” Maryan Zablotskyy, macroeconomist at Erste Bank Ukraine, points out.
Ukraine’s economic policy is weak both fiscal and monetary wise. On the one hand, the state budget has had a good balancing influence on fiscal policy - since 2000, the average budget deficit has stood at just 0.75% of GDP. However, budget planning was only conducted for one year, which meant that the government has tended to increase spending in nominal terms during times when steel prices and growth were increasing and this tends to amplify the economic cycle and the impact of steel price volatility on the economy. Consequently, the sudden plummeting of steel prices in the current crisis caught the government off guard.
ECONOMIC FORECAST
Ukraine will see the sharpest slowdown of all the countries in Eastern Europe in 2009. The cabinet released its macroeconomic forecast for 2009, projecting real GDP growth of just 0.4% on year. These numbers are based on the Economy Ministry’s optimistic scenario and assume an improvement in foreign demand and effectiveness of the government’s anti-crisis measures. Earlier, the ministry announced an estimated 5% GDP decline based on the pessimistic scenario, which the ministry has not released.
Dragon has a bit more pessimistic scenario, with GDP declining by either 0.7% in case of a fast global recovery, or by 4%, in a more pessimistic case. Fitch forecasts a contraction in Ukraine’s real GDP in 2009 by 3.5%. Erste analysts project a recession of 2.5% of GDP in 2009, with economic growth returning only in the second half of 2009.
“Despite clearly having very strong international support, it will take some time to sort out the imbalances. Still, as the political sphere is now united by a foreign anchor (International Monetary Fund loan), we believe that there is a good chance that Ukraine might finally start implementing the reforms that it did not do for 10 years,” says UBS.
If it does, the medium term looks good: “GDP growth will return to its potential growth of 5-6% in 2010, while inflation is likely to come down to a single-digit figure,” conclude Erste analysts.
Ukraine had the highest rate of inflation in Europe in 2008, but the crisis was a blessing in that it at least helped slow to 22.3% in November the galloping price rises. “We consider the government’s one-digit inflation forecast much less realistic as the hryvnia’s sharp depreciation will put significant pressure on domestic prices. We currently expect inflation in Ukraine to rise by 14.2% on year (base case) or 16.9% on year (pessimistic case) in 2009,” says Dragon
inflation forecasts
Government 9.5%
Dragon 14.2% (base) - 16.9% (pessimistic)
Fitch 17.5%
Foyil Securities 14.5%
DEVALUATION
Ukraine is vulnerable to external shocks to its currency as nearly 50% of total lending in Ukraine is in foreign currency. After spending more than $7.5bn – 20% of its reserves – to support the hryvnia in October and November, the NBU lowered both its official rate repeatedly, and its interbank intervention rate to finally unify them both at the IMF’s behest.
The hryvnia lost nearly 60% of its value from its high in May 2008 of UAH4.5/USD as a result of the crisis. By the end of December the currency had probably oversold and was trading at UAH8.2/USD, at which point the government said it would stabilize.
The optimal level of the UAH/USD will depend on steel prices and Erste analysts project the optimum level to be around UAH7 per dollar, which suggests the currency has overshot at UAH8/USD. However, ultimately the value of the currency will depend on where steel prices settle.
In order to remove some of this unpredictability from the public finances, one of the strings the IMF has attached to its loan is the government must set up a UAH40bn stabilisation fund that can be used to issue stabilisation loans and bail out banks. The fund will be maintained in the future partly from privatisation receipts and the whole privatisation programme has been put back on the agenda for 2009.
The average exchange rate in 2009 will be UAH7.30/USD, according to the government. However, the currency will be affected by Ukraine’s unpaid gas debts to Russia and the price it has to pay for gas imports.
However, the really big change is the current crisis has effectively smashed the foreign currency trading band inside which the NBU has kept the hryvnia more or less constant at about UAH5/USD for most of the last five years.
CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT
The government is hoping to reduce the current account deficit in 2009 as a result of the devaluation. “I hope that a fall in fuel prices, a very moderate rise in gas prices and the exchange rate will bring a zero or a deficit of the current account at 1-2% [of GDP],” Deputy Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine Oleksandr Savchenko said in December.
Fitch estimates the current account deficit will rise to $4.5bn, while the total foreign debt that needs to be paid in 2009 is $45.6bn, equivalent to 157% of Ukraine’s international hard currency reserves. Andrew Colquhoun, the director of sovereigns group at Fitch Ratings, said that clearly Ukraine will not be able to meet these payments unless it can raise some external financing.
With steel exports falling and the compensatory inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) also slowing, balancing the current account has become a major challenge going forward. FDI in Ukraine in 2008 is projected at $8bn-9bn and in 2009 at over $5bn, said the NBU’s Oleksandr Savchenko.
BANKS
Ukraine’s fast growing bank sector came close to collapse and the rescue measures are likely to have far reaching consequences on the whole sector.
“The government received the right to borrow money in foreign currency on the local market and use government bonds to buy troubled banks [as part of its new crisis powers]. These, alongside the increase in the state fund guarantee for deposits from UAH50,000 to UAH150,000 (covering 99% of individual accounts) and the increase in refinancing activities by the NBU are meant to secure overall banking system stability, which is likely to go through a period of large-scale evolutionary changes,” say analysts at Erste. “The IMF and Ukraine have effectively agreed on driving further consolidation in the banking sector. Even with minimum capital requirements twice those in Europe, Ukraine has some 170 banks, a number that could fall by as much as 30% in 2009 and 2010.”
An attempt to rescue the troubled Prominvestbank seems to have failed and is likely to be nationalised. The whole sector should enter a period of consolidation running into 2009.
EQUITY
After equity prices rose 136% in 2007, the Ukrainian equity market lost nearly 80% in 2008, wiping out all the gains for the last several years in the process. By the start of 2009, Ukraine was one of the cheapest markets in the world in terms of P/E ratios. Only Russia is cheaper.
“Ukraine’s premiums over Russia are justified in our view, as the Ukrainian economy is to a large extent hedged against decreasing commodity prices,” explain analysts at Galt & Taggart. “The country is a large net importer of hydrocarbons, which impact directly on production costs for energy-intensive Ukrainian industries. We believe any potential natural gas price hike in 2009 is more likely to be symbolic. Despite Gazprom’s fear-mongering rhetoric, reference prices are falling and Ukraine holds the transit and storage keys to the bulk of Russian gas exports to Europe. In addition, a bottom-up inspection offers a number of national champions like Enakievo Steel and Ukrsotsbank, among others, which have some of the lowest valuations in their Eastern European peer groups.”
But comparisons to Russia are of limited value due to the vast difference in the size of the markets. Daily trading volumes on the Russian markets are in the billions of dollars whereas in Ukraine the volumes have crashed from between $30m-60m down to about $1m a day as of the end of 2008. Such tiny liquidity makes prices extremely susceptible to shocks.
“Given the liquidity and volatility issues are likely to plague the Ukrainian market until the world finds answers to the financial upheaval, we recommend investors look at shares traded abroad, namely London and Warsaw. Liquidity on those markets remains better than on the local market due to stricter disclosure requirements, better market infrastructure and the presence of ‘quality’ long-term investors. For all intents and purposes, the Ukrainian agricultural sector is represented only on foreign bourses and we see the sector as a solid performer in uncertain times,” says G&T.
|
Technorati Tags: MBS Ltd., fiscal policy, commodity prices, Galt & Taggart, natural gas prices, Gazprom, Romania, Hungary, Poland, equity, P/E ratios, Prominvestbank, Oleksandr Savchenko, bank sector, Andrew Colquhoun, Fitch Ratings, foreign direct investment, FDI, current account deficit, foreign debt, Russia, NBU, inflation, domestic prices, slowdown, recession, economic growth, monetary policy, budget planning, Maryan Zablotskyy, economic cycle, GDP, steel prices, external trade, World Trade Organization, Erste Bank Ukraine, foreign exchange reserves, International Monetary Fund, IMF, instability, East Europe, National Bank of Ukraine, Anton Olff, retail sector, reforms, hryvnia, U.S. dollar, depreciation, privatiziations, www.businessneweurope.eu, Ukraine, economy,
Tags: Andrew Colquhoun, Anton Olff, bank sector, budget planning, commodity prices, current account deficit, depreciation, domestic prices, East Europe, economic cycle, economic growth, economy, equity, Erste Bank Ukraine, external trade, FDI, fiscal policy, Fitch Ratings, foreign debt, foreign direct investment, foreign exchange reserves, Galt & Taggart, Gazprom, GDP, hryvnia, Hungary, IMF, inflation, instability, International Monetary Fund, Maryan Zablotskyy, MBS Ltd., monetary policy, National Bank of Ukraine, natural gas prices, NBU, Oleksandr Savchenko, P/E ratios, Poland, privatiziations, Prominvestbank, recession, reforms, retail sector, Romania, Russia, slowdown, steel prices, U.S. dollar, ukraine, World Trade Organization, www.businessneweurope.eu Posted in Uncategorized | No Comments »
Thursday, December 11th, 2008
|
Richard Hainsworth’s commentary on www.businessneweurope.eu is correct about the current Russian banking system. The global economic crisis has strained even the healthiest banks and systems beyond what they were “engineered” to do.
It will be interesting to see how the Russian Government responds to this. They could for example, recapitalize some banks during periods of seasonal stress, providing short term bridge loans.
The question of long term financing is something that will need to be addressed once the immediate crisis is in a more manageable stage. Russia, as well as other emerging markets-could probably do more to open its banking sector to foreign competition.
Quality not quantity in Russian banking |
|
Richard Hainsworth of RusRating/GlobalRating December 11, 2008
Assessing the asset quality underlying a bank or banking system is an essential prerequisite for making a judgment about its strength. The irrational exuberance of the early 2000s has given way to equally irrational pessimism currently afflicting traders.
The facts are certainly clear: there is a wave of corporate defaults, and Russian banks are having their liquidity and operational risk system tested. Some have failed. Nevertheless, the interpretation of these facts needs to be rational.
Two structural factors need to be considered in such an interpretation. First, the Russian economy has a single tax year, ending on December 31. This means that all contractual obligations, trade transactions and long-standing loan agreements tend to be tied to the year-end. The pressure on all banks and corporates to close operations is always highest in November and December. Consequently, any economic activity peaks at this time, which also means that the strain in a period of turbulence will be severest at this time. It is analytically incorrect to take data points from November and December and extrapolate them linearly into January and February.
Secondly, Russia – just like all the countries of the CIS – does not have any significant source of medium to long term (viz., over a year) funding. At the same time, companies in a period of expansion need funding for three to five years because it takes that long for a new piece of plant or project expansion to be bought, installed and start generating cash. The result is that the real economy needs three-to-five year funding, but the banks can only provide short-term lending. The result is a maturity gap between the needs of the economy and the abilities of the banking sector.
Ordinarily, this is no problem. A functioning economy is a dynamic system and short-term funding is constantly being replenished with interest income and repayments from the real sector. Banks are willing to lend to corporates for longer periods, but for compliance purposes request one-year loan contracts. Corporates hedge their refinancing risks by establishing lines with several banks. However, when there is a liquidity crunch, the banking system as a whole retains liquidity and corporates cannot refinance. Since the loans are one-year long, they come due. They cannot be refinanced, so the corporate defaults. In ordinary times, a default means that the company is weak or mismanaged. But in a time of crisis, the corporate may be strong, but without liquidity. A default in a time of crisis does not mean that the underlying corporate is weak.
Deeper questions
This leads to a much deeper question of finance and economics. If an enterprise or bank is judged to be strong solely on the grounds of its liquidity in a time of global crisis, then what should it do in a time of normality? If it retains levels of liquidity in reserve that would be adequate in times of crisis, then it will be unable to lend those resources for any long period of time. This will reduce the rate at which a banking system can lend to the economy and the ability of the economy to grow and develop.
Returning to Russia, the inability of companies to repay the principle on loans that do not match their borrowing requirements is more about their levels of liquidity going into the crisis. Those loans may still be performing in terms of interest being paid and would not be considered to be in default had the legal form matched the economy substance.
Taking these two factors (intense year-end contractual activity and a contractual mismatch in funding) into consideration, a wave of corporate defaults during a global crisis in November and December does not mean that the Russian economy or the banking system is inherently weak, or that it’s inevitable the crisis will continue into 2009.
Richard Hainsworth is CEO of RusRating/GlobalRating, CFA |
Technorati Tags: Richard Hainsworth, short-term funding, Russian economy, CIS countries, tax year, irrational exuberance, irrational pessimism, traders, corporate defaults, Russian banks, liquidity, Anton Olff, emerging markets, foreign competition, RusRating/Global Rating, Russia, www.businessneweurope.eu, economic crisis, Russian government,
Tags: Anton Olff, CIS countries, corporate defaults, economic crisis, emerging markets, foreign competition, irrational exuberance, irrational pessimism, liquidity, Richard Hainsworth, RusRating/Global Rating, Russia, Russian banks, Russian economy, Russian government, short-term funding, tax year, traders, www.businessneweurope.eu Posted in Uncategorized | No Comments »
Thursday, December 4th, 2008
Two articles of interest. The first is a currency update from www.businessneweurope.eu The consensus on “the street,” in Odessa and Kyiv, is that the hryvnia will continue its slide as the Ukrainian government will not have the resources to intervene in the currency markets.
The second is from www.ukrnews.com This article deals with the anticipated temporary rise in the hryvnia that occurs around holidays. Anyone visiting Ukraine during this summer will recall that the hryvnia was pegged at a seemingly unrealistic 4.60 to the U.S. dollar, only to depreciate significantly once the season had ended.
After the holidays, may come the hangover!!
Ukraine moves to flexible exchange rate as hryvnia slides 50%
James Marson in Kyiv December 3, 2008
With Ukraine’s central bank curtailing moves to support the free-falling hryvnia, the local currency has slid further from 5.79 to the dollar on November 18 to 7.24 on December 3, marking an almost 50% drop in value since the start of the year. The central bank now believes the market has almost found the “satisfactory” rate.
After massive currency interventions in October caused the country’s foreign exchange reserves to drop by $6bn, the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) has started to move towards a flexible exchange rate, a condition of the $16.4bn loan the country got from the International Monetary Fund. “Without a flexible exchange rate, we can’t overcome the crisis. No amount of currency reserves would be sufficient,” Oleksandr Savchenko, deputy chairman of the NBU, told a conference organized by Fitch Ratings on November 27.
Currency auctions have been introduced to smooth the hryvnia’s slide to its equilibrium rate. “The market is looking for the satisfactory rate,” Savchenko said. “We believe it has almost been found.”
The hryvnia has come under pressure from all sides as the country’s exports plummeted, demand for dollars shot up to repay dollar loans and people converted their savings out of the national currency. “People have been rapidly converting into dollars - there’s low trust in the hryvnia,” says Olena Bilan, an analyst at Dragon Capital. “When the hryvnia started to fall in October, people rushed to get rid of their hryvnia holdings.” NBU figures show that Ukrainians bought $2bn more in foreign currency in November than they sold.
On the positive side, the hryvnia’s fall is a boost to struggling exporters and should help Ukraine close its current account deficit, which reached 7% of GDP in the second quarter of 2008. “The implications of a weak hryvnia are huge,” says Oleksandr Klymchuk, an analyst at Concorde Capital. “It raises the competitiveness of exporters and gives locally produced goods a price advantage over imports.”
But it’s also a threat to banks, as Ukrainians struggle to pay back their loans, 50% of which are denominated in dollars. Fitch on Friday downgraded the outlook for 11 of the country’s banks, citing concerns about the deterioration in asset quality and the threat to confidence in the currency. “The devaluation pressure will persist into next year. It’s difficult to predict where the exchange rate will move, as it’s a question of confidence,” Bilan said.
A recovery of the hryvnia next year is likely, analysts say, as people convert their money back into hryvnia to spend, and a tight monetary policy from the NBU restricts hryvnia supply. If currency inflows from foreign direct investment and privatization pick up, the hryvnia should stabilise around 7.5, Klymchuk believes. If not, he predicts the rate could slide as far down as 9 or 10 hryvnia against the dollar.
(16:09, Wednesday, December 3, 2008)
Bankers are expecting the traditional strengthening of the hryvnia on the cash market on the eve of New Year to take place this year.
“I think that there will be a situational strengthening,” said Viacheslav Utkin, a member of the supervisory board of Enerhobank.
According to Utkin, the hryvnia will strengthen because of winter holidays and vacations.
“There will be large expenditures ahead of the holidays, the vacations,” Utkin said.
According to him, the hryvnia’s cash rate could reach 7 UAH/USD.
Erik Naiman, the head of the department of financial instruments at Ukrsotsbank, is also not ruling out the possibility of the cash rate of the hryvnia rising before New Year.
“That happens [traditionally] because people sell dollars in order to have a good holiday,” he said.
Naiman declined to forecast the margin by which the hryvnia with strengthen, but he said that it would be insignificant.
AvtoZAZbank’s Board Chairman Vladyslav Bairak was unable to forecast a possible strengthening of the hryvnia on the eve of New Year.
“At present, I do not have such confidence,” Bairak said.
According to him, citizens have shown a lack of confidence in the hryvnia in the past month.
As Ukrainian News earlier reported, the hryvnia fell by 5 kopecks to 7.45 UAH/USD on the inter-bank currency market on December 2.
Technorati Tags: currency, bankers, AvtoZAZbank, Vladyslav Bairak, cash, Erik Naiman, Ukrotsbank, Viacheslav Utkin, Enerhobank, monetary policy, devaluation, current account deficit, GDP, Oleksander Klymchuk, Concorde Capital, Dragon Capital, Olena Bilan, National Bank of Ukraine, NBU, International Monetary Fund, IMF, Oleksandr Savchenko, flexible exchange rate, www.businessneweurope.eu, Odessa, Kyiv, Ukraine, www.ukrnews.com, Anton Olff, hyrvnia,
Tags: Anton Olff, AvtoZAZbank, bankers, cash, Concorde Capital, currency, current account deficit, devaluation, Dragon Capital, Enerhobank, Erik Naiman, flexible exchange rate, GDP, hyrvnia, IMF, International Monetary Fund, Kyiv, monetary policy, National Bank of Ukraine, NBU, Odessa, Oleksander Klymchuk, Oleksandr Savchenko, Olena Bilan, ukraine, Ukrotsbank, Viacheslav Utkin, Vladyslav Bairak, www.businessneweurope.eu, www.ukrnews.com Posted in Uncategorized | No Comments »
|
|
 |
|
 |
|